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The efficiency of incentive mechanism to management, which is 
determined by the status and function of managers in modern enterprises, plays 
an essential role in market economy. In particular, the quality of operating 
performance of bank managers has decisive influence on the survival and 
development of the corresponding bank. Therefore, establishing appropriate 
incentive mechanism of bank managers in order to encourage full consideration 
on the short-term benefit and long-run development of the bank, and to reduce 
agency cost between the owner and the manager by the greatest possible extent, 
is a common topic that all banks are confronted with. 
This paper starts with a concise discussion of incentive theory, and then 
elaborates the contents and patterns of two representative kinds of short-term 
and long-term incentive mechanism, annual salary system and stock option 
respectively. Annual salary system has obtained widespread adoption in 
developed countries. Thus the author makes a comparative analysis on the 
experience of implementing annual salary system in US, Germany and Japan, 
and draws lessons for the possibility of success in transplanting the system into 
the Bank of Beijing. Similarly, stock option as a manner of long-term motivation 
has been widely applied all over the world. Suitable stock option design could 
effectively resolve the problem of inconsistency between the preferences and 
objectives of the separated owners and agents, and consequently enhance the 
profit-making ability of the enterprise. The above expatiation offers theoretical 
basis for the design of stock incentive plan of the Bank of Beijing. 
In the next chapter, the author addresses the necessities of introducing the 
annual salary system for the Bank of Beijing, following the analysis of the status 
quo and existing problems of the incentive scheme in the Bank of Beijing. The 














characteristics of the managers, which would generate impact on the 
performance of the incentive plan, and proposes basic principles that should be 
embodied in the plan. Specifically, the structure of annual salary takes the form 
of “base salary + achievement-related income + welfare allowance”. 
Stock option incentive system in its perfect sense should be supplemented 
by external conditions such as highly-developed capital market and mature 
manager market, and internal conditions such as the healthiness of corporate 
governance structure. Currently, the Bank of Beijing has not met all the 
prerequisites, but it should put up the build of long-term incentive mechanism 
onto the agenda as soon as possible to cope with the severity of market 
competition. This paper suggests an alternative way to appreciate and introduce 
the idea of stock option motivation, that is, the simulated stock option incentive 
mechanism. The author designs the overall plan and discusses the alternative 
methods of price formation in detail.  
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“北京银行”（Bank of Beijing）①成立于 1996 年 1 月 8 日，其前身是北
京市 90 家城市信用合作社。“北京银行”成立九年多来，坚持以发展为第一



















截至 2005 年 1 月，存款余额 1800 亿元，是成立初期的 10 倍；贷款余额超
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第二节  年薪激励的内容和模式 
























































根据对 2003 年美国福布斯 500 强排名中选出的 20 家银行 1992—2002
年数据的分析，基本年薪通常是银行业高管人员收入中 为稳定的部分，
每年的变动幅度不大，各银行 CEO 在 1992--2002 年间平均基本年薪变动幅
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